The University of Akron

IdeaExchange@UAkron
Akron Law Review

Akron Law Journals

May 2019

Adrift on Erie: Characterizing Forum-Selection
Clauses
Kermit Roosevelt III
Bethan R. Jones

Please take a moment to share how this work helps you through this survey. Your feedback will be
important as we plan further development of our repository.
Follow this and additional works at: https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview
Part of the Civil Procedure Commons
Recommended Citation
Roosevelt, Kermit III and Jones, Bethan R. (2019) "Adrift on Erie: Characterizing Forum-Selection Clauses," Akron
Law Review: Vol. 52 : Iss. 2 , Article 5.
Available at: https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol52/iss2/5

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Akron Law Journals at IdeaExchange@UAkron, the
institutional repository of The University of Akron in Akron, Ohio, USA. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Akron Law Review by an authorized administrator of IdeaExchange@UAkron. For more information, please
contact mjon@uakron.edu, uapress@uakron.edu.

Roosevelt and Jones: Adrift on <i>Erie</i>

ADRIFT ON ERIE: CHARACTERIZING FORUMSELECTION CLAUSES
I.
II.
III.
IV.
V.

The Arguments of Erie .............................................. 298
The Erie Problem....................................................... 305
Choice of Law Characterization Revisited ................ 309
Unresolved-Erie: Forum-Selection Clauses .............. 314
Conclusion ................................................................. 320
Kermit Roosevelt III ∗ and Bethan R. Jones ♦

Since it was decided 80 years ago, Erie has grown into one of our
greatest, or perhaps most notorious, cases. But what does it stand for?
What is it based on? Is it even correct? There is a wealth of scholarship
addressing these questions. Erie has become something of a Rorschach
test: a complex pattern onto which scholars can project a wide array of
different concerns.
Here, we aim to offer a very simple view of Erie. As we will describe
it, Erie is a case about power. It is about, first, who has the power to make
certain laws, and then, second, who has the power to interpret them. Seen
from this perspective, Erie has nothing to do with a distinction between
substance and procedure. That distinction becomes relevant only later,
and only because of the conflict of laws rule that a forum will use its own
procedural law, even if deciding a case according to foreign substantive
law. This rule, of course, requires a court to decide what is substantive
and what is procedural. That is a familiar conflict of laws topic: substanceprocedure characterization.
Yet Erie analysis—though it is often associated with distinguishing
issues of substance from procedure—is different from conflict of law
substance-procedure characterization. Indeed, something that is
∗ Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School.
♦ Associate, Kellogg, Hansen, Todd, Figel & Frederick. The views expressed in this article are those
of the authors alone.
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procedural from the conflict of laws perspective may still be “substantive
for Erie purposes.” How did this happen? And what insights can be
learned from the conflict of laws perspective? In what follows, we will try
to answer those questions. We will give the simple reading of Erie. We
will show how it requires conflict of laws substance-procedure
characterization, and how the Supreme Court has started doing something
else instead.
Or has it? No one really seems to know what the Court is doing when
it engages in Erie analysis. Part of what we seek to demonstrate is that
Erie analysis is just conflict of laws substance-procedure characterization
with a few other steps thrown in. It is intelligible, that is, in conflict of
laws terms—more intelligible, probably, than on its own terms.
To demonstrate this last point, we will do two things: First, we will
describe the approach that the Court has come up with—initially in the
way the Court has developed it, and then from a conflict of laws
perspective. We believe the conflicts description is far easier to
understand and does a better job of illuminating the actual issues at stake.
Second, we will turn to a problem that has puzzled both courts and
scholars: Is a contractual choice-of-forum clause substantive or
procedural for Erie purposes? Erie analysis struggles with this question
but the conflict of laws analysis offers an easier resolution.
I. THE ARGUMENTS OF ERIE
The facts of Erie are well known and relatively simple; we rehearse
them here only briefly. 1 On a dark night, Harry Tompkins was injured by
a train operated by the Erie Railroad while walking alongside the tracks
in Pennsylvania. 2 Tompkins was a Pennsylvania resident; the railroad
company was a New York corporation. 3 Invoking federal diversity
jurisdiction, Tompkins filed suit in the Southern District of New York. 4
A key issue in the case was the duty of care: what degree of fault on
the part of the railroad was required for Tompkins to recover? Was mere
negligence enough? Or would Tompkins have to show something more—

1. See, e.g., Kermit Roosevelt III, Choice of Law in Federal Courts: From Erie and Klaxon
to CAFA and Shady Grove, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 1 (2012), for a more extended recital.
2. See Erie R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 70 (1938). For an in-depth recounting of the story,
see, e.g., Edward A. Purcell, Jr., The Story of Erie: How Litigants, Lawyers, Judges, Politics, and
Social Change Reshape the Law, in CIVIL PROCEDURE STORIES 21, 36–38 (Kevin M. Clermont ed.
2d. ed. 2008).
3. Erie, 304 U.S. at 69.
4. See id.
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”willful or wanton injury?” 5 A court addressing this question today would
begin by deciding which law governed the issue. Most choice of law
systems, modern and traditional, would select the law of the place of the
accident: Pennsylvania law.6
That was also, more or less, the conclusion of the lower federal courts
in Erie. Although Erie analysis is now used to choose between state and
federal law, no one thought that federal law might govern this gardenvariety tort issue. (In fact, it couldn’t, since there was no federal law
setting the duty of care). Nor did anyone think that the law of any state
other than Pennsylvania law might govern the question of whether
conduct within Pennsylvania was wrongful. The answer to the question of
the required degree of fault, then, would have to come from Pennsylvania
law.
More or less. That qualification requires a brief explanation of the
legal ontology of the pre-Erie regime—the one associated with Swift v.
Tyson. 7 Under the thinking of that time, there were several different types
of law that might have governed in a particular case. First, there was
federal law: federal statutes, the Constitution, and some judge-made
federal law such as admiralty law. 8 This law was made by the federal
government (or, in the case of the Constitution, the national People) and
federal courts were its authoritative interpreters. The U.S. Supreme Court
has the last word on the content and meaning of federal law.
Second, there was state law: state statutes, state constitutions, and
some judge-made law, such as rules of real property. This law was made
by state governments, and state courts were its authoritative interpreters.
A state’s court of last resort has the last word on the content and meaning
of that state’s law. 9
Third—the category that no longer exists in modern legal
thought 10—there was general law. General law included most of the
5. See Tompkins v. Erie R.R., 90 F.2d 603, 604 (2d Cir. 1937).
6. The traditional territorial approach selected the law of the state where the right to redress
vested, which, in the case of torts, was generally the location of the tort: lex loci delicti. See, e.g.,
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS: WHAT CONSTITUTES AN APPOINTMENT OF MOVABLES
§ 394 (Am. Law Inst. 1934). Modern approaches would reach this conclusion using interest analysis.
7. Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1, 18–20 (1842).
8. See id.
9. See id.
10. Some scholars defend the continued existence of general law. See, e.g., Lea Brilmayer,
Untethered Norm after Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins: Positivism, International Law, and the Return
of the “Brooding Omnipresence, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 725 (2013); Caleb Nelson, The Persistence
of General Law, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 503 (2006); Stephen E. Sachs, Finding Law, 107 CAL. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2019). To the extent that these scholars argue that judges making common law (state or
federal) sometimes write as though they are finding law rather than making it, they are certainly
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classic common law subjects, such as torts and contracts. 11 The distinctive
thing about general law was that, although it was the law in a state—what
degree of fault Tompkins had to show to recover was a general law
question 12—it was not the law of a state in the way that local law was: an
exercise of that state’s sovereign prerogative to make law. 13 General law
was not understood to be made by state courts or by states at all; instead,
it was found. 14 And because it was not made by any particular state, no
state and no court could claim authority to definitively determine its
content. Courts in different states, or state and federal courts within the
same state, might disagree about the content of the general law, and no
court had the power to bind any other to follow its interpretation. 15
What that meant for Tompkins was that while all courts agreed which
law determined the degree of fault he needed to show, they might still
differ on what the content of that law was. And so, by picking the right
forum, he could obtain favorable law—or, more precisely, a favorable
interpretation of the general law that everyone agreed controlled his
claim. 16 That is what he did. Pennsylvania courts had ruled that the

correct. They are also right in arguing that a state could arrange its legal system so that its judges were
charged with applying law they had no power to make. Such would be the case if a state legislature
enacted a statute providing that the tort law of the state would be identical to that of Ohio, changing
with the decisions of Ohio courts. (Something similar actually happens with some state constitutional
provisions, if the state court of last resort declares them identical to a similar federal provision and
thereby commits itself to follow federal decisions interpreting the federal provision.) The key feature
of the general law for our purposes, and the feature that no longer exists, was that it operated as law
within the state in the absence of any state act recognizing it as law and was beyond the power of state
courts to alter.
11. See, e.g., Edward A. Purcell, Jr., Ex Parte Young and the Transformation of the Federal
Courts, 1890–1917, 40 U. TOL. L. REV. 931, 947 (2009) (describing “‘general’ law to include most
common-law fields, including wills, contracts, [and] torts . . .”).
12. Tompkins v. Erie R.R., 90 F.2d 603, 604 (1937).
13. Justice Holmes described general law as “the assumption that there is ‘a transcendental
body of law outside of any particular State but obligatory within it unless and until changed by
statute.’” Erie R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 79 (quoting Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v.
Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518, 533 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting)).
14. See, e.g., Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. Baugh, 149 U.S. 368, 378-79 (1893) (explaining how
the general law was not created by governments but deduced by judges).
15. See generally Kermit Roosevelt III, Light from Dead Stars: The Procedural Adequate and
Independent State Ground Reconsidered, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1888, 1896–97 (2003) (discussing
independent interpretation of general law).
16. The railroad actually argued that this was a question of local law. See Brief for Petitioner
at 23–25, Erie R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (No. 367), 1938 WL 35347, at *23–25. The brief
makes interesting reading. It does not make a frontal attack on Swift, but instead argues that courts
have misapplied the doctrine, which should distinguish between local and general issues primarily by
the criterion of whether state courts have established a firm rule. That is a fair reading of Kuhn v.
Fairmont Coal Co., 215 U.S. 349 (1910), and would get you most of the way to Erie by effectively
replacing the local/general distinction with a settled/unsettled distinction. Id at 33.
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standard was willful or wanton, but most other states and the federal courts
had decided that mere negligence was enough. So, by picking the
Southern District of New York, Tompkins was able to avoid the
unfavorable interpretation of the Pennsylvania courts.
Ultimately, of course, the ploy didn’t work. The Supreme Court
decided to reject the Swift framework. There are many different theories
about how exactly the opinion works; Erie itself gives three different
arguments in support of the decision: one grounded in statutory
interpretation, one grounded in policy analysis, and one grounded in the
Constitution.
The statutory argument was that, for one hundred years, the Court
had been misreading the Rules of Decision Act, which specified that, in
cases where federal law did not supply the rule of decision (i.e., diversity
cases), federal courts should use the “laws of the several states.” 17 “Laws,”
the Court had thought, meant statutory law, not unwritten law. But, Justice
Brandeis wrote, “the more recent research of a competent scholar”
(namely, Brandeis’s friend Charles Warren), has “established that the
construction given to [the Act] by the Court was erroneous.” 18
Academics might hope that their research will induce the Court to
abandon a century of precedent (though they might also hope for a loftier
accolade than “competent”), but that seldom occurs—especially not in the
context of statutory interpretation, where the Court has explained that the
principle of stare decisis has exceptional force.19 Thus, Erie also offered
a policy basis for rejecting the Swift regime. The hope of Justice Story—
Swift’s author—was that state courts would follow federal court
explication of the general common law. That would produce nationwide
uniformity, which would be desirable, particularly for commercial law,
which was at issue in Swift. But state courts proved less complaisant than
Story had hoped. (This may have been at least in part because federal
courts aggressively expanded the category of general law, wresting away
from state courts the last word not only over commercial matters but also
garden-variety torts. 20) In consequence, rather than uniformity throughout

17. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 34, 1 Stat. 73.92 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1652
(2006)).
18. Erie, 604 U.S. at 72–73, 92 n.5.
19. Id. at 77 (“If only a question of statutory construction were involved, we should not be
prepared to abandon a doctrine so widely applied throughout nearly a century.”); see also, e.g.,
Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t, LLC, 135 S.Ct. 2401, 2409 (stating that “stare decisis carries enhanced
force when a decision . . . interprets a statute”).
20. See Michael G. Collins, Before Lochner—Diversity Jurisdiction and the Development of
General Constitutional Law, 74 Tul. L. Rev. 1263 (2000). Justice Brandeis also attributed the Swift

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2019

5

Akron Law Review, Vol. 52 [2019], Iss. 2, Art. 5

302

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[52:297

the nation, the Swift regime produced disuniformity within individual
states—something that strikes most observers as at least prima facie
undesirable. 21 Policy-Erie thus seeks to promote intrastate uniformity. It
suggests that, to the extent possible, a federal court exercising diversity
jurisdiction should be “only another court of the State.” 22
But even a strong policy argument might struggle to overcome one
hundred years of statutory interpretation. Last, Erie offers something
irresistible: the Constitution. The Swift regime, Brandeis proclaims, was
not just mistaken in its statutory interpretation and undesirable in its
policy consequences. 23 It was unconstitutional. Exactly which
constitutional provision was violated has been the subject of some
debate, 24 but the basic outlines of the constitutional argument are
relatively clear. The argument is about the distribution of power within
our constitutional system: who has the authority to make certain kinds of
law, and who, concomitantly, has the authority to determine the meaning
of those laws.
In order to tee up the question about who can make certain laws, Erie
requires a preliminary step: the claim that laws are in fact made, rather
than found. 25 If the general common law existed independent of state legal
regime’s failings to the “[p]ersistence of state courts in their own opinions on questions of common
law.” Erie, 604 U.S. at 74.
21. See Erie, 604 U.S. at 74 (noting that “the benefits expected to flow from [Swift] did not
accrue”). If you think that the law declared by federal courts was superior in quality to that declared
by state courts, or that federal courts were primarily combatting bias against out-of-staters, then the
Swift regime might actually seem desirable. See, e.g., Michael S. Greve, THE UPSIDE-DOWN
CONSTITUTION 149-151 (2012). If you take the modern view of the nature of common law, however,
this policy argument is not weighty enough to disrupt the constitutional allocation of authority within
our federal system. That, ultimately, is what the Erie court concluded.
22. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 108 (1945).
23. See Erie R. v. Tompkins, 604 U.S. at 77–78 (1938).
24. See generally Kermit Roosevelt III, Valid Rule Due Process Challenges: Bond v. United
States and Erie’s Constitutional Source, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 987 (2013).
25. This needn’t be the case necessarily or in all conceivable legal systems. The premise that
Brandeis needs is not that law cannot be found in an epistemological sense, nor that states could not
replicate the situation of found law by instructing federal courts to exercise interpretive independence
with respect to state law. See Sachs, supra note 10. (State X could, presumably, do both these things
by enacting a statute specifying that its tort law would be identical to the tort law of sister state Y, as
pronounced by Y courts, and that no other courts need defer to X court interpretations of Y law. Some
states have in fact done similar things by announcing that the content of their constitutional provisions
is identical to that of similar federal constitutional provisions, as articulated over time by the Supreme
Court. See, e.g., People v. Caballes, 851 N.E.2d 26, 31–45 (Ill. 2006) (discussing variants of the
“lockstep” doctrine)). It is simply that in the world Erie confronted, states had the power to make law
on certain topics, that they had delegated that power to their judges, and that they had not prescribed
federal or sister-state interpretive independence with respect to that law. Holmes, whom Brandeis
quoted at length, sometimes wrote as though he was announcing a general jurisprudential principle
about the nature of law which states could not alter. See Sachs, supra note 10. Erie’s pronouncements
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systems—if it was not made by anyone but rather, as the skeptical Holmes
put it, a “brooding omnipresence in the sky,” 26 independent of the state
but obligatory within it unless and until changed by statute—then
arguments about which sovereign had the power to make one of its rules
would be beside the point. Erie rejected that idea: there may be customs
out there in the world; there may be majority rules or consensus among
judges, but those things are not the law of a state unless the state makes
them so. 27 The first step in Erie’s argument, then, is the claim that law
does not exist as law without some sovereign behind it. There is no general
common law 28 that is obligatory of its own force within states unless
changed by statute.
So, what was the source of the rule about the degree of fault that
Tompkins had to show? With the general common law—a body of law
without a sovereign behind it; law without a lawmaker—out of the picture,
the possible candidates were federal and state law. The rule plainly was
not federal. Congress has the power to prescribe such a rule for interstate
railroads, but that does not mean that federal courts have the power to
make it in the absence of congressional action. More important, the
federal government as a whole lacks the power to make all of the rules
should, perhaps, have been limited to the proposition that the power to make and interpret certain
laws was given to the states, not that it had to remain with them. Given the context of Erie, in which
state and federal judicial systems were fighting for authority over certain issues, it seems reasonable
to suppose that states did not intend to disclaim this authority. See generally Edward A. Purcell, Jr.,
BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTION: ERIE, THE JUDICIAL POWER, AND THE POLITICS OF
THE FEDERAL COURTS IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA (2nd ed. 2000). The best evidence that
federal courts were in fact seizing authority against the will of the states is probably the fact that even
when state courts characterized some issues as “local”—and hence subject to state and not general
law—federal courts rejected that characterization, insisting that the issues were general, and hence
that federal courts were independent. See generally Anthony J. Bellia Jr. & Bradford R. Clark,
General Law in Federal Court, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 665, 693–98 (2013) (describing process
whereby states attempted to localize general law while federal courts attempted to generalize local
law).
26. S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
27. See Erie, 604 U.S. at 78. The crucial sense of the made vs. found distinction, then, is not
epistemological: it is not how judges go about determining what the law is. (They might look to
custom or consensus, or a Restatement, or the words of a statute.) It is ontological: a rule is not the
law of a state unless the state says it is. And when the state says it, the state is, at least presumptively,
authoritative about what that law means. (States could, as noted above, disclaim interpretive authority.
But this is an unusual enough step that it seems wise not to assume they have done so unless they say
so explicitly. The mere idea that judges should identify legal norms by a process that looks like finding
rather than making is not such a statement. Judges obviously find the law in this sense when they
interpret state statutes, but no state of which we are aware has decided that the interpretations of its
courts should not be authoritative with respect to its statutes.)
28. Erie says that “[t]here is no federal general common law,” id., which we view as slightly
imprecise: the upshot of Erie’s claim about the nature of law is that there is no general common law
at all.
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that federal courts had identified as part of the general law. And if any
part of the federal government did make that law, it would be real federal
law, preempting inconsistent state law and creating federal question
jurisdiction. No one thought that the general common law was that kind
of federal law. So, whatever lawmaking power lay with the federal
government as to the required degree of fault, that power had not been
exercised. The law that prescribed the required degree of fault was not
federal law.
That left state law. The first step of the constitutional Erie argument
is that there must be some sovereign behind the rules previously
understood as general common law; the second step is that that sovereign
must be a state because federal lawmaking power does not extend to the
full body of general common law and, in any case, has not been exercised.
And based on the dominant choice of law understanding at the time, the
sovereign behind the specific rule in Tompkins’s case had to be the State
of Pennsylvania. The required degree of fault is an issue of Pennsylvania
State law. Who has the authority to decide what the content of
Pennsylvania law is? This is the third step of Erie: the sovereign that
makes a law is the sovereign that gets to have the last word on the content
of that law. It is imaginable, of course, that a state might disclaim that
power—it might say that sister-state and federal courts were not required
to follow the interpretations of the state court of last resort. It might even
subordinate its own interpretations by saying that its law was identical to
that made by actors outside the state—that its constitutional free speech
guarantee was identical to the federal First Amendment as interpreted by
the Supreme Court. 29 (A federal statute might say that federal procedural
law would be whatever the states used at the time of trial. 30) But as a
starting point, and in the absence of some unusual specification, state
courts are authoritative as to what their state law means.
So, the constitutional argument of Erie, and the predominant basis
on which its outcome rests, is an argument about power—about which
sovereigns in our system have the power to make certain laws, and which
sovereigns consequently have the power to authoritatively interpret them.
The conclusion of the constitutional argument is straightforward and now
relatively uncontested. Within the realm of authority reserved to the
states—or within the zone where state and federal authority overlap but
federal power has not been exercised—states make the law and have the
power to say what their law means.

29.
30.

See Caballos, 851 N.E.2d at 31–45 (discussing lockstep doctrine).
See The Conformity Act, Act of June 1, 1872, ch. 255, § 6, 17 Stat. 196 (1872). (repealed).

https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol52/iss2/5

8

Roosevelt and Jones: Adrift on <i>Erie</i>

2018]

ADRIFT ON ERIE

305

II. THE ERIE PROBLEM
Interestingly, the problem that Erie analysis is currently understood
to address has very little to do with the constitutional argument described
in the preceding section. That argument is about power, not policy. In fact,
Erie was initially understood this way. The earliest Supreme Court
citation to Erie, Ruhlin v. New York Life Insurance Company, 31 described
Erie explicitly as a case about power—more specifically, about whether
federal courts were bound to follow state court interpretations of contracts
governed by state law. Erie, the Court said, “settles the question of power.
The subject is now to be governed, even in the absence of state statute, by
the decisions of the appropriate state court.” 32 A number of similar
decisions swiftly followed Erie, vacating lower court decisions that had
characterized certain issues as matters of general law, rather than state
law. 33 The better-known Klaxon v. Stentor decision, likewise, reversed a
lower federal court that had assumed the authority to use general law
principles of conflict of laws rather than following state court choice-oflaw decisions. 34 Again, the main theme of Klaxon is deference to state
authority. “Our federal system,” the Court wrote, “leaves to a state, within
the limits permitted by the Constitution, the right to pursue local policies
diverging from those of its neighbors. It is not for the federal courts to
thwart such local policies by enforcing an independent ‘general law’ of
conflict of laws.” 35
Klaxon did, however, highlight policy-Erie in a way that the earlier
decisions did not. If federal courts did not follow state court choice-oflaw decisions, the Court noted, “the accident of diversity of citizenship
would constantly disturb equal administration of justice in coordinate
state and federal courts sitting side by side.” 36 It went on to characterize
this “principle of uniformity within a state” as the principle “upon which
the Tompkins decision is based.” 37 Rather than a decision about the
relative powers of state and federal courts, then, Erie was coming to be
seen as a decision based on a policy of uniformity. 38
31. Ruhlin v. New York Life Ins. Co., 304 U.S. 202 (1938).
32. Id. at 205.
33. See, e.g., New York Life Ins. Co. v. Jackson, 304 U.S. 261 (1938); Rosenthal v. New York
Life Ins. Co., 304 U.S. 263 (1938); Hudson v. Moonier, 304 U.S. 397 (1938).
34. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
35. Id. at 496.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. See also Andrew D. Bradt, Symposium, Forum Selection After Atlantic Marine: Atlantic
Marine and Choice-of-Law Federalism, 66 HASTINGS L. J. 617, 634 (2015) (“One hallmark of the
Court’s [choice-of-law decisions is] a willingness to accept some degree of interstate disuniformity
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As far as the issue that Erie itself confronted was concerned, the
power perspective aligned perfectly with the policy of uniformity. One
way to produce uniformity between state and federal courts is for federal
courts to use state law, and all of the decisions holding that a certain issue
was not one of general law (because the general law did not exist as law),
but rather state law, achieved uniformity while simultaneously
recognizing state power over the particular issue and the content of its
own law. After Erie, the prospect of disharmony appeared not when an
issue was governed by general law (because, again, there were no such
issues) but when it was governed by federal law.
That might be because the substantive law governing the issue was
federal—for instance, the issue was related to rights and liabilities of the
federal government or its instrumentalities.39 There are such decisions, but
these cases are still recognizably about power: the federal government has
the power to displace state law on issues of federal concern, and the cases
recognize instances in which it has done so. The possibility that modern
Erie analysis addresses, however, is a different one: it is that federal law
might govern an issue in a diversity case because the issue is procedural.40
At this point, Erie has (apparently) turned into a familiar choice of
law issue: substance-procedure characterization. A court may use foreign
substantive law to decide a case, but it will still use its own local
procedure. 41 Hence, some means of distinguishing substance from
procedure is required.
Again, it should be noted, this is not the problem that Erie itself
confronted. Substance-procedure characterization has nothing to do with
the existence of the general common law, nor with the question of whether
state courts have the last word on the meaning of state law. The need for

in exchange for intrastate uniformity.”). Constitutional- or power-Erie is still present in modern Erie
analysis via the requirement that a federal rule really regulates procedure. This step recognizes the
limited scope of federal lawmaking power. However, it has never affected the outcome in any Erie
case.
39. Some early Erie cases conclude that certain issues, such as contracts with the federal
government or its instrumentalities, are governed by federal substantive law. See, e.g., D’Oench,
Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447 (1942); United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 315 U.S. 289
(1942); Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 744 (1943). The interaction between state
substantive law and federal substantive law is indeed an Erie problem—it is far closer to the original
Erie decision than modern Erie analysis—but it is not the focus of this article.
40. As we will argue later, characterizing issues, rather than state or federal laws, as procedural
is a mistake: each sovereign is entitled to decide whether its laws are substantive or procedural. That
is the import of constitutional Erie. But since this is the conventional framing, we use it here.
41. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAW: WHAT LAW GOVERNS PROCEDURE
§ 585 (Am. Law Inst. 1934); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS: ISSUES RELATING TO
JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION § 122 (Am. Law Inst. 1971) (stating general principle).
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such characterization existed before Erie, at least in theory, since a federal
court applying state local law or general common law would still have
applied federal procedure. 42 What made the problem acute was not Erie
but the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, adopted in 1938: before then,
federal courts followed the Conformity Act of 1872, which prescribed that
federal procedure would conform “as near as may be” to state laws
“existing at the time.” 43
The first significant Supreme Court decision describing Erie in terms
of substance and procedure is Guaranty Trust v. York, in which the Court
confronted the question of whether a federal court should allow a New
York limitations period to foreclose relief on a New York state-law
claim. 44 This was a conventional choice-of-law characterization problem
with a relatively clear answer: traditional choice-of-law analysis, and
apparently New York law too, deemed limitations periods procedural,
meaning that a forum would use its own law (rather than the foreign law
that created the claim) to determine timeliness.45
But Guaranty Trust took another tack. Erie analysis, the Court said,
was not the same as choice of law substance-procedure characterization.
True, the principle that courts used local procedure even while deciding
substantive issues under foreign law was familiar from conflict of laws.46
“But,” the Court said,
of course “substance” and “procedure” are the same key-words to very
different problems. . . . Each implies different variables depending upon
the particular problem for which it is used. . . . It is therefore immaterial
whether statutes of limitation are characterized as “substantive” or
“procedural” in State court opinions in any use of those terms unrelated
to the specific issue before us. 47

Erie, in the eyes of the Guaranty Trust Court, was not about power
so much as policy: it was dictated less by the Constitution than by a desire
to promote uniformity:

42. See Gregory Gelfand & Howard B. Abrams, Putting Erie on the Right Track, 49 U. PITT.
L. REV. 937, 958 (1988) (“Erie Railroad v. Tompkins did not create the Erie-procedure/substance
distinction”).
43. Conformity Act of 1872, ch. 255, §§ 5-617 Stat. 196, 197 (1872) Prior to the Conformity
Act, federal procedure was governed by the 1792 Process Act, which required federal courts to use
the procedures in place in state courts in 1789, rather than updating as state practice evolved.
44. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
45. Id. at 109.
46. Id. at 108.
47. Id. at 108-09.
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In essence, the intent of that decision was to insure that, in all case where
a federal court is exercising jurisdiction solely because of the diversity
of citizenship of the parties, the outcome of the litigation in the federal
court should be substantially the same, so far as legal rules determine
the outcome of a litigation, as it would be if tried in a State court. The
nub of the policy that underlies Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins is that for the
same transaction the accident of a suit by a non-resident litigant in
federal court instead of in a State court a block away, should not lead to
a substantially different result. 48

In this way, Guaranty Trust made “outcome-determinativeness” part
of the Erie test. That by itself is puzzling. Outcome-determinativeness has
little to do with power and likewise little to do with conflict of laws
substance-procedure characterization. 49 Later cases complicated the
picture further: sometimes a federal policy would justify overriding an
outcome-determinative state law, 50 unless perhaps the state law was really
substantive; 51 federal rules of civil procedure would always displace
contrary state laws, 52 but judge-made procedural common law that filled
gaps in the rules might not; 53 sometimes the federal and state rules might
combine to form something entirely new. 54
Erie analysis has thus become confusing and is generally considered
unsatisfying. The Court does not seem to have a strong and consistent
theory about what it is doing. 55 The next section argues that a choice of
law perspective can supply that theory and return Erie analysis to its
theoretical roots.

48. Id. at 109.
49. Not nothing: one could say that if the claim is based on state law, the state should have the
power to determine the outcome, or that laws that determine the outcome are ipso facto substantive
in the choice of law sense (and hence that the traditional choice of law characterization of limitations
periods is wrong). We will address this latter point in more detail.
50. See Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., 356 U.S. 525, 535 (1958).
51. See id. (noting that a state rule may be so “bound up with [the definition of the] rights and
obligations [of the parties] that its application in federal court is required”) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
52. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965). Hanna is also notable for the statement that
“The broad command of Erie was [that] federal courts are to apply state substantive law and federal
procedural law.” Id. at 465. As noted above, that principle existed before Erie and played no role in
the Erie decision itself.
53. See Ragan v. Merchs. Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530 (1949).
54. See, e.g., Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415 (1996).
55. In addition to its inconsistencies and vacillations about how the analysis is supposed to go
and what, exactly, it is supposed to achieve, the Court has never explained how substance and
procedure can overlap—how an issue can be deemed procedural by a state and yet substantive under
federal law, as in Guaranty Trust, or vice-versa.
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III. CHOICE OF LAW CHARACTERIZATION REVISITED
Suggesting that the choice of law perspective on substanceprocedure characterization can aid Erie analysis might seem surprising,
for two reasons. First, substance-procedure characterization is murky and
unsatisfying within traditional choice of law.56 And second, Guaranty
Trust explicitly rejected it. This section, however, aims to demonstrate
that a particular understanding of choice of law can in fact be helpful—
that it can return Erie analysis to the firmer foundations of the original
Erie problem: the problem of power.
The choice of law perspective we advocate here is what we have
called the two-step model. 57 The two-step model, probably best attributed
to Brainerd Currie, 58 conceives the choice of law problem as a matter first
of determining the scope of relevant state laws—that is, determining
which state laws reach the facts of the case—and second, if an issue falls
within the scope of more than one state’s law, resolving conflicts between
those laws by giving priority to one. This perspective has some immediate
implications in terms of power. Most notably, it suggests that each state
has the authority, within constitutional limits, to determine the scope of
its law—that is a question of the content and meaning of that law, of who
can and cannot claim rights under it—but that no state has the authority to
bind other states to any particular resolution of conflicts between state
laws. Which law should be given priority is not a question of the meaning
of state law.

56. See generally Herma Hill Kay, Larry Kramer, & Kermit Roosevelt, CONFLICT OF LAWS:
CASES, COMMENTS, QUESTIONS 50 (9th ed. 2013) (describing literature on characterization as “large
but uninformative”).
57. See, e.g., Kermit Roosevelt III & Bethan Jones, What a Third Restatement of Conflict of
Laws Can Do, 110 AJIL UNBOUND 139 (2016).
58. The territorial approach identified a single relevant state by “deduction from territorial
postulates.” David F. Cavers, A Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem, 47 HARV. L. REV. 173, 178
(1933). Rejecting this view, Currie theorized that a court should determine the applicability of a state’s
law by examining its purposes and whether its application would further those purposes (i.e., by
asking whether a certain set of facts fell within the scope of a state’s law). See, e.g., Brainerd Currie,
The Constitution and Choice of Law: Government Interest Analysis and the Judicial Function, 26 U.
CHI. L. REV. 9, 9–10 (1958); Brainerd Currie, Married Women’s Contracts: a Study in Conflict-ofLaws Method, in SELECTED ESSAYS ON CONFLICT OF LAWS, 75, 107–120 (1963); see also Larry
Kramer, Interest Analysis and the Presumption of Forum Law, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1301, 1303 (1989)
(identifying “Currie’s central insight” as the principle “that multistate cases should be resolved by the
same methods as domestic cases.”). If more than one state is “interested,” the conflict must be
resolved. Different approaches have different methods of resolving such conflicts. (Currie initially
suggested a preference for forum law, then moderated this suggestion by advising that the forum first
attempt to eliminate the conflict by adopting a moderate and restrained interpretation of its policies.)
But the common analytical step is assigning one law priority over another.
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Erie itself is immediately intelligible from this perspective: what
Erie says is that the required degree of fault is an issue that falls within
the scope of Pennsylvania law and Pennsylvania law alone, no general
law being in existence and no federal law having been enacted.
Pennsylvania law thus must supply the rule of decision, and the content
of Pennsylvania law is a question on which Pennsylvania courts have the
last word.
What about modern Erie analysis? Modern Erie, more specifically
the substance-procedure distinction, is also intelligible in terms of the
two-step model. Substance and procedure can be distinguished in terms
of scope. If we begin with the proposition that the scope of a sovereign’s
law is a question about the rights that law grants, a substantive law gives
parties rights that can be asserted in any forum. A procedural law gives
rights that are tied to a particular forum and cannot be asserted anywhere
else. 59 This perspective immediately resolves some of the confusions
around modern Erie analysis. It tells us that we should characterize
individual laws, rather than issues, as substantive or procedural. It tells us
that the power to determine whether a particular law is substantive or
procedural, as a matter of the scope of that law, rests with the enacting
sovereign. It shows us how substance and procedure can overlap and
conflict—a state substantive law, giving rights that can be asserted in
federal court, can conflict with a federal procedural law, which also gives
rights in federal court. And it tells us that by characterizing an issue as
procedural, we are, at least potentially, giving priority to forum law as
against conflicting foreign law. 60
The two-step model thus gives us some conceptual clarity about what
is going on in Erie analysis. It does not tell us what the right outcome to
particular cases is: defining substance and procedure in terms of forum
dependence and independence does not tell us how to categorize laws. But
it does provide a more useful analytical framework for characterizing laws
as substantive or procedural than the traditional notions of primary vs.
secondary conduct, or rights vs. remedies.61 To determine the scope of a
law, modern choice of law theory and statutory interpretation generally
tell us to look at the policies behind it. In the Erie context, we can look at

59. See Michael Steven Green, The Erie Doctrine: A Flowchart, 52 AKRON L. REV. 215, 216
(2019).
60. Potentially because if the foreign law is procedural, there is no conflict: both states agree
that the issue is procedural, and their laws reach only litigation in their own courts.
61. See, e.g., Allen R. Stein, Erie and Court Access, 100 YALE L.J. 1935, 1949–51 (1991)
(discussing traditional ways of distinguishing substance and procedure); Lawrence B. Solum,
Procedural Justice, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 181, 192–225 (2004) (discussing distinction).
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the policies behind particular laws and ask whether they are forumdependent or not. Procedural policies are those that are limited to litigation
in a particular forum; substantive policies are implicated regardless of
where litigation takes place. Characterizing those policies may help us to
characterize laws. It will also help us remember a principle that will prove
important: if we are going to characterize a particular law as procedural—
and hence give priority to forum law over foreign substantive law without
a more general choice of law analysis—we’d better have a procedural
policy behind it.
The value of this approach can be seen specifically in an analysis of
Guaranty Trust. If we think about procedure and substance in terms of
scope, Guaranty Trust should look odd, at least based on the account the
Court offers. The scope of New York law is a question for New York
courts—but the Supreme Court rejects their views. 62 It focuses not on the
distribution of power between state and federal courts (constitutional
Erie) but rather the policy of uniformity. In its enthusiasm for policy-Erie,
Guaranty Trust actually strays from Erie’s constitutional basis, usurping
a power (the determination of the scope of state law) that properly belongs
to the states. If New York directs that its limitation period can be invoked
only in New York courts, federal courts have no power to construe it
differently. 63
Is there any way to rescue the decision? There are two points worth
considering. First, as to the specific issue in Guaranty Trust (limitations
periods), traditional choice of law characterization was probably wrong in
1945. 64 The modern view is that limitations periods serve both substantive
and procedural purposes (they both allow defendants peace of mind and
allocate judicial resources to fresh rather than stale claims) and so a claim
time-barred under the law that creates it will be held time-barred in
another state’s courts. 65 Modern choice of law characterization, that is,
62. Perhaps not entirely: Guaranty Trust says that the characterizations of state court opinions
are immaterial “in any use of those terms unrelated to the specific issues before us.” Guaranty Trust
Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 at 109 (1945). But since state courts lack the opportunity to pronounce on
the characterization of their laws for Erie purposes, this effectively declares federal independence.
See Green, supra note 59 at 216.
63. See Byrd, 356 U.S. at 535 (“[F]ederal courts . . . must respect the definition of state-created
rights and obligations by the state courts.”); see also Michael Green, Erie’s Suppressed Premise, 95
MINN. L. REV. 1111, 1167 (2011) (observing that Erie requires federal courts to follow state supreme
court interpretations of state law).
64. For a classic criticism of the traditional approach, see Bournias v. Atlantic Mar. Co., 220
F.2d 152, 154–55 2d Cir. 1955).
65. States have widely rejected the traditional characterization of limitations periods as
procedural by enacting borrowing statutes allowing for the state to borrow another state’s shorter
statute of limitations if the cause of action arises in that jurisdiction. For a general discussion of
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gets the answer that Guaranty Trust wanted. Had Guaranty Trust arisen
now, it would not have needed to sever Erie analysis from choice of law
characterization to get the desired result. 66
But still, if New York decides that its limitations periods are
procedural, that is its right. It is not for federal courts to thwart that policy
by expanding the scope of New York law. The second point is that the
two-step model would have allowed the Court to accept that allocation of
power—it could have recognized that New York has the power to
determine the scope of its own law—and still find the claim time-barred.
Suppose the New York limitations period is procedural: it gives
defendants a defense that can be asserted only in New York courts. Well
and good: there still must be some limitations period that operates in
federal courts. What should that limitations period be? A federal
limitations period used to govern a state claim in federal court is
procedural—it is not going to bar litigation in state court—so we should
look to procedural policies. Allocation of judicial resources to fresh rather
than stale claims is one such policy, but uniformity of result between state
and federal courts is another: it is a policy that choice of forum should not
be driven by the choice between federal and state law. That is a policy that
is about litigation in federal court and nowhere else, so it is properly
considered in crafting the federal procedural rule. Thus, it would make
sense to say that in deciding the limitations period that would govern in
federal court, the federal courts would mirror the limitations period that
would govern in state court. The federal courts could make federal
procedural law that incorporated the content of relevant state law, as in
fact they often do. 67
Generally, viewing the Erie problem through the lens of the two-step
model allows us to think about it in terms of power—that is, it returns
modern Erie analysis to the original Erie argument. It also gives us a better
understanding of what the Supreme Court has done, and what it might
have done better.

borrowing statutes, see Ibrahim J. Wani, Borrowing Statutes, Statutes of Limitations and Modern
Choice of Law, 57 UMKC L. REV. 681 (1989).
66. Interestingly, before Guaranty Trust there was an argument for moving choice of law
characterization in the same direction by adopting essentially an outcome-determinative test. See
Morgan, Choice of Law Governing Proof, 58 HARV. L. REV. 153, 195 (1944) (“It is time to abandon
both the notion and the expression that matters of procedure are governed by the law of the forum . . . .
[courts should apply foreign law] to all such matters of procedure as are likely to have a material
influence upon the outcome of litigation except where (a) its application will violate the public policy
of the forum or (b) weighty practical considerations demand the application of the law of the forum.”).
67. See, e.g., United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 728–29 (1979).
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Two-step Erie also explains what is at stake in the substanceprocedure distinction. As we have explained, whether a state law is
substantive or procedural is a question of its scope: substantive laws give
rights that can be asserted in any court; procedural laws give rights tied to
a particular forum. The scope of a state law is up to the state. So, in
deciding whether a state law is substantive or procedural, federal courts
should be guided by state decisions, to the extent those decisions are about
scope, and in the absence of relevant decisions, by an analysis of the
policies underlying the law. If a state law is procedural under our
definition, it will never be given effect in federal court. In simplest terms,
it creates no rights that can be asserted there. The rule that governs an
issue will therefore be federal. The content of that federal rule can, of
course, mirror the content of state law, and for policy-Erie reasons, such
mirroring will often be desirable. Calling a state law “substantive for Erie
purposes” despite indications from state courts that they consider it
procedural is best understood as mirroring the content of state law.
If, however, a state law is substantive, it may be given effect in
federal court, but it may also be displaced if priority is given to federal
procedural law. Federal law can preempt state law if the federal lawmaker
so wills. Current Erie analysis assumes that the Federal Rules are always
intended to preempt, although this is not necessarily as clear as some
justices seem to think. 68 But when judges make federal procedural
common law to fill gaps in the rules, the preemption decision has clearly
not been made, and judges may decide not to preempt, or to make law that
takes account of the substance of state law. 69 This decision should be
guided by procedural policies, most notably Erie’s policy in favor of
uniformity of result. Other federal policies may at times be relevant, but
they should be procedural policies and not substantive ones.
This description, we think, gives a clear picture of what goes on in
Erie decisions and is a more useful theoretical foundation to guide courts
than the Supreme Court’s disjointed account. In the next section, we will
try to show how two-step Erie helps the analysis of a particularly knotty
problem.
68. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. at 471 (1965). The reason it is not so clear is that the Rules
Enabling Act specifies that the federal rules are not to “abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive
right,” 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2006), which could well be understood to direct courts to give priority
to state substantive law in conflicts. See Shady Grove Orthopedic Assoc., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co.,
559 U.S. 393 (2010).
69. See, e.g., Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740 (1980) (finding no conflict between
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 3 and determining when an action is commenced for the purpose of
tolling Oklahoma’s statute of limitations); Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415 (1996)
(applying New York’s standard of review for measuring the excessiveness of a jury verdict).
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IV. UNRESOLVED-ERIE: FORUM-SELECTION CLAUSES
Erie analysis has any number of vexing problems, but one of the most
difficult is one that the Court has yet to fully resolve: the treatment of
forum-selection clauses. Such clauses generally prescribe that suit shall
be brought only in particular courts. 70 States differ as to whether such
clauses are valid as a matter of state contract law.71 The federal standard,
announced by the Supreme Court in The Bremen 72 and Carnival Cruise
Lines, 73 is that such clauses are enforceable unless the resisting party can
clearly show that enforcement would be unreasonable and unjust, or that
the clause was invalid for such reasons as fraud or overreaching. 74
That federal standard controls in admiralty jurisdiction, but what
about diversity? If suit is brought in federal court on the basis of diversity,
and a contract between the parties contains a forum-selection clause,
should its validity be determined under the Bremen standard, or under the
state law that governs the contract?
The Supreme Court has come close to this question, but it has not
answered it. In Stewart Organization v. Ricoh Corporation, it ruled that if
a party moved to transfer a case under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) based on the
existence of a forum-selection clause, the court should use federal law to
decide the motion. 75 That much seems obviously correct: since § 1404(a)
is a federal statute, motions under it should be decided under federal law.
In Atlantic Marine Construction Company v. U.S. District Court for

70. See forum-selection clause, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009) (defining a forum
selection clause as a “contractual provision in which the parties establish the place . . . for specified
litigation between them”). Forum selection clauses may be “permissive,” whereby the parties agree
to submit to the jurisdiction of certain courts without prohibiting suit elsewhere, or “mandatory,”
making selected forum exclusive. See Stephen E. Sachs, The Forum Selection Defense, 10 DUKE J.
CONST. L. & PUB POL’Y 1, 4 (2015); see also Patrick J. Borchers, Forum Selection Agreements in the
Federal Courts After Carnival Cruise: A Proposal for Congressional Reform, 67 WASH. L. REV. 55,
56 (1992).
71. For example, some states have passed laws limiting or prohibiting the enforcement of
forum selection clauses, particularly in certain contexts. See Jason A. Lien, Forum-Selection Clauses
in Construction Agreements: Strategic Considerations in Light of the Supreme Court’s Pending
Review of Atlantic Marine, THE CONSTRUCTION LAWYER, Fall 2002, at 30 (noting that “at least 24
states have enacted” prohibitions on the enforcement of forum selection clauses in industries such as
construction); see also Kevin M. Clermont, Governing Law on Forum-Selection Agreements, 66
HASTINGS L.J. 643, 648 (2015) (noting some states consider forum-selection clauses “per se
unenforceable” while others “ignore them by giving less weight” or “subject them to more
defenses.”).
72. M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 15 (1972).
73. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 586 (1991).
74. Id. at 593.
75. 487 U.S. 22, 28 (1988) (concluding “[F]ederal law, specifically 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a),
governs the parties’ venue dispute.”).
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Western District of Texas, the Court offered some more clarity about how
to make that decision: a valid forum-selection clause, it said, “should
control except in unusual cases.” 76 But neither Stewart nor Atlantic
Marine addressed the question of what law should be used to determine
the validity of the clause. 77 On this issue, the circuits are split and scholars
disagree. 78
It is not surprising that characterization of forum-selection clauses is
difficult within the conventional Erie framework. From an issue-based,
abstract perspective, forum-selection clauses look procedural: they are
about the conduct of litigation. 79 Yet they are also arguably outcomedeterminative: choice of forum can affect choice of law and hence alter
the parties’ substantive rights. Forum-selection clauses also limit
exposure to the risk of litigation in an undesired location 80 and are
sometimes part of the parties’ bargained-for exchange. 81 As Stephen
Sachs has put it, “the questions posed by forum selection are even murkier
than usual.” 82

76. Atlantic Marine Const. Co., Inc. v. U.S. District Court for Western District of Texas, 571
U.S. 49, 64 (2013).
77. See, e.g., Wong v. PartyGaming Ltd., 589 F.3d 821, 826 (6th Cir. 2009) (explaining the
Court has not decided “the Erie issue of which law governs when a federal court, sitting in diversity,
evaluates a forum selection clause in the absence of a controlling federal statute.”).
78. Most federal circuits have held “the enforceability of a forum selection clause implicates
federal procedure and should therefore be governed by federal law.” Id. at 827; accord Doe 1 v. AOL
LLC, 552 F.3d 1077, 1081 (9th Cir. 2009); Phillips v. Audio Active Ltd., 494 F.3d 378, 384 (2d Cir.
2007); Fru-Con Constr. Corp. v. Controlled Air, Inc., 574 F.3d 527, 538 (8th Cir. 2009); Ginter ex
rel. Ballard v. Belcher, Prendergast & Laporte, 536 F.3d 439, 441 (5th Cir. 2008); P & S Bus. Machs.
v. Canon USA, Inc., 331 F.3d 804, 807 (11th Cir. 2003); see also Stephen E. Sachs, Five Questions
After Atlantic Marine, 66 HASTINGS L.J. 761, 768 (2015) (noting most courts have applied federal
law to the question regardless of the law governing the contract or giving rise to the suit). The seventh
and tenth circuits have applied the law that governs the whole contract, see Jackson v. Payday Fin.,
LLC, 764 F.3d 765, 774 (7th Cir. 2014); Yavuz v. 61 MM, Ltd., 465 F.3d 418, 428 (10th Cir. 2006).
Many scholars agree with this approach, see Clermont, supra note 71 at 653 (noting “the few scholars
who have ventured into the thicket align in favor of applying the parties’ chosen law.”).
79. For example, the ninth circuit has explained that forum selection clauses implicate federal
procedural issues. See Manetti-Farrow, Inc. v. Gucci Am., Inc., 858 F.2d 509, 513 (9th Cir. 1988).
Interestingly, the sixth circuit also relied on “the possibility of diverging state and federal law on an
issue of great economic consequence, the risk of inconsistent decisions in diversity cases, and the
strong federal interest in procedural matters in federal court,” to support its holding. Wong, 589 F. 3d
at 827.
80. See Borchers, supra note 70 at 57 (stating “The right to litigate in one forum or another has
an economic value that parties can estimate with reasonable accuracy.”); see also Matthew J.
Sorensen, Enforcement of Forum-Selection Clauses in Federal Court After Atlantic Marine, 82
FORDHAM L. REV. 2521, 2528 (2014).
81. See Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991).
82. Sachs, supra note 70, at 768.
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From the choice of law perspective, however, how courts sitting in
diversity should treat forum-selection clauses is clearer. First, a forumselection clause is substantive in terms of whether the rights it creates are
forum-dependent or not. The whole point of a forum-selection clause is to
confer a right—the right to dismissal—that can be asserted in any forum
other than the chosen one. 83 Since it is a substantive contractual provision,
there is no obvious reason why its validity should be determined by any
law other than the one that governs the rest of the contract. As to the scope
of state laws validating or invalidating such a clause, these laws are also
clearly an attempt to determine the parties’ substantive rights: they are
about rights that can, or cannot, be asserted in any forum. Whether the
state’s law creates or withholds such rights is a question of state law,
beyond the power of federal courts to contradict.
Second, there is a difference between the question of whether a
forum selection clause is valid and the question of what effect the clause
should have in federal litigation, though this distinction is not always
recognized. 84 A motion to transfer under § 1404(a) is not simply an
attempt to enforce the clause, and so it makes sense that the analysis under
§ 1404(a) should not be limited to the question of whether the clause is
valid. A valid clause might, in exceptional circumstances, not be enough;
an invalid clause might, in some circumstances, carry some weight. 85
What about a motion that is simply an attempt to enforce the clause?
Stephen Sachs has suggested that the most straightforward way to do this
in federal court would be to present it as an affirmative defense, either via
83. At least, that is true of mandatory forum selection clauses. Some forum-selection clauses
are permissive, rather than exclusive: they provide that the parties agree to submit to the jurisdiction
of certain courts without prohibiting suit elsewhere. See Stephen E. Sachs, The Forum Selection
Defense, 10 Duke J. Const. L. & Pub Pol’y 1, 4 (2015).
84. In Atlantic Marine, the Court assumed the validity of the forum selection clause and went
on to address its effect. In fact, generally the Court has approached forum selection clauses from an
enforceability perspective, likely on account of the “ouster doctrine.” Historically, courts refused to
enforce forum selection clauses reasoning that such clauses impermissibly ousted the jurisdiction of
the court. See M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co , 407 U.S. at 9 (1972). This theory was rejected
in The Bremen, but its legacy explains why courts might separate the question of enforcement from
the question of whether a forum selection clause otherwise meets the prerequisites for contract
formation (e.g., mutual consent etc.). As Justice Scalia notes in Stewart dissent, the latter question—
issues of validity— “are nearly always governed by state law.” Stewart Organization v. Ricoh
Corporation, 487 U.S. at 36 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting). This distinction is, however, suggested by
the Court in The Bremen: “The correct approach would have been to enforce the forum clause
specifically unless [the plaintiff] could clearly show that enforcement would be unreasonable and
unjust, or that the clause was invalid for such reasons as fraud or overreaching.” The Bremen, 407
U.S. at 15 (emphasis added).
85. In fact, the Court recognizes that “It is conceivable in a particular case . . . that because of
[the § 1404(a)] factors a district court acting under § 1404(a) would refuse to transfer a case
notwithstanding the counterweight of a forum-selection clause.” Stewart, 487 U.S. at 30–31.
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a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) or perhaps a motion for summary
judgment, and we agree. 86 A forum-selection clause can be understood as
an affirmative defense that demonstrates a failure to state a claim. The
plaintiff may have alleged all the elements of a cause of action, but if he
has also promised not to sue at all (if he has settled his claim), the court
should dismiss. Likewise, if he has promised not to sue in certain courts,
that promise should be a defense to suit in those courts.
In deciding that motion, a federal court should initially determine
whether the forum-selection clause is valid under the law that governs the
contract. If it is, then that state is attempting to give the defendant a
defense. If it is not, the state is not attempting to do so. The existence or
non-existence of that state-law defense is a question for the state, and the
federal court cannot contradict it by calling the issue procedural.
Again, however, the validity of the clause under state law is not
necessarily dispositive. State substantive law and federal procedural law
can overlap, and federal procedural law might preempt contrary state law.
Whether a particular party can maintain a suit in federal court is a
procedural question, in that it is within the procedural lawmaking power
of federal courts. As Sachs frames it, a forum-selection clause is an
attempt to waive a federal right: the right to sue in a federal court. 87 To
maintain federal supremacy, federal law must control the effect of that
waiver, just as it had to control the effect of the purported waiver of a
FELA claim in Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown Railroad. 88
We thus suggest the following view of the issue of forum-selection
clauses in diversity cases. Whether the clause confers rights under state
law is a question of state substantive law, to be decided under the state
law that governs the contract. The effect of those rights in federal court is
a question of federal procedural law. As with a § 1404(a) motion, a federal
court might decide that a valid forum-selection clause does not justify
dismissal, and it might decide that an invalid clause does.
What, you might wonder, is the point of separating the issues? Does
this not just amount to a decision that federal law controls? Not in the
sense that most courts and commentators have taken it—it does not mean
86. As an affirmative defense, the forum selection clause could also be pled in an answer and
raised in a motion for judgment on the pleadings. See Sachs, supra note 70 at 32. But this, of course,
assumes the forum selection clause is evident on the face of the complaint. And, as the Court notes in
Atlantic Marine, “unlike a motion under § 1404(a) or the forum non conveniens doctrine, [a Rule
12(b)(6) motion] may lead to a jury trial on the venue if issues of material fact relating to the validity
of the forum-selection clause arise.” Atlantic Marine Const. Co., Inc. v. U.S. District Court for
Western District of Texas, 571 U.S. 49 at n.4 (2013)
87. See Sachs, supra note 70 at 4–9.
88. Dice v. Akron, C. & Y. R. Co., 342 U.S. 359, 362 (1952).
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that federal courts should use the standard from The Bremen and enforce
clauses that meet that standard. 89 What it means is that federal courts
should create a procedural rule based on procedural policies—policies
that apply in federal court and not elsewhere. The most obvious such
policy is the Erie policy in favor of uniformity, which counsels simply
mirroring state law. 90 This policy suggests that federal courts should
dismiss if the forum-selection clause is valid under the appropriate state
law and refuse to dismiss if it is not. If we consider only this policy, or if
we find it the dominant one, then the effect will be that forum-selection
clauses are governed by state law because federal procedural law either
gives way to contrary state substantive law or incorporates it.
Are there other policies that federal courts might consider? If the
federal policy was strongly against forum-selection clauses on the
grounds that they tended to be unfair, that might count as procedural. The
policy that the federal courts should not be vehicles for oppression is a
policy linked to litigation in federal courts and not elsewhere. 91 We can
imagine policies that would justify federal courts in refusing to enforce
forum-selection clauses that were enforceable under the state law that
governs the parties’ contract. 92
But that is not the situation in the real world. In the real world, the
federal policy is more permissive; the issue that arises in diversity cases
is whether a federal court should use The Bremen standard to enforce a
forum-selection clause that is invalid under the state law that governs the
contract. Federal courts have the power to do this, we believe—they can
create a federal procedural rule that gives such effect to even an invalid
forum-selection clause. That is, they can dismiss based on a forumselection clause that is invalid under the law that governs the contract. But
if they are to do so, the characterization of this federal rule as procedural
means that they should be able to identify a procedural policy in support
of it: a policy that is implicated by litigation in federal court but not
elsewhere.
89. Sachs, interestingly, does not seem to assume that the selection of federal law as controlling
necessarily leads to application of The Bremen standard. Instead, he observes that “any federal law
on the topic might, in turn, incorporate state law by reference.” See Sachs, supra note 70 at 5 n.17.
90. But see Wong v. PartyGaming Ltd., 589 F.3d 821, 828 (2009), (seeking to maintain
“harmony among the Circuits.”).
91. This framing suggests that the traditional public policy exception in choice of law is linked
to the substance-procedure distinction. Of course, it is: the theory behind the traditional public policy
exception is that a state may recognize rights under foreign law but deny a remedy under its own law.
See, e.g., Ancile Inv. Co. Ltd. v. Archer Daniels Midland Co., 992 F. Supp. 2d 316, 319 (S.D.N.Y.
2014); Loucks v. Standard Oil Co. of New York, 120 N.E. 198 (1918).
92. For example, some commentators have framed the federal interest as an interest in
“choos[ing] to control its own jurisdiction and venue.” Clermont, supra note 71, at 651.
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We do not believe that anyone has done so. At the least, the policies
in support of The Bremen standard do not fit the bill. They are substantive
policies. In The Bremen, for instance, the Court wrote, “The expansion of
American business and industry will hardly be encouraged if,
notwithstanding solemn contracts, we insist on a parochial concept that
all disputes must be resolved under our laws and in our courts.” 93 Those
policies are not limited to litigation in federal court; they apply regardless
of where suit is brought. If they govern in diversity cases, they should
govern in state court as well; they should govern as federal substantive
law, displacing contrary state law. But of course they don’t. Congress
could prescribe them as a nationwide federal law, but federal courts could
not, and in any event neither Congress nor the courts has tried to. From
the power perspective, in terms of substantive law, the situation is the
same as that in Erie. Only one lawmaker has exercised its substantive
power, and that is the state.
Can federal courts displace state substantive law without a
procedural policy? They have the power to do so—they have in fact done
so. 94 But there is a cost, which the conflict of laws perspective also
reveals. The cost is that a state substantive policy is thwarted without
advancing any other policy. 95 Ferens v. John Deere Company 96 provides
an analogous, albeit more extreme, example. In Ferens, a Pennsylvania
resident was injured by a combine manufactured by a Delaware
corporation, in Pennsylvania. 97 Pennsylvania tort law granted Ferens a
claim, but that grant also provided a two-year statute of limitations, and
Ferens did not file suit until three years after the accident. 98 Knowing this,
Ferens chose an unlikely forum to file suit: federal court in Mississippi.
Mississippi considered limitations periods procedural, and this meant
Mississippi applied its six-year statute of limitations to Ferens’
Pennsylvania tort claim. 99 Once the tort claim was deemed timely, Ferens
transferred the case under § 1404(a) to the Western District of
Pennsylvania. 100

93. The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 9.
94. That is what our analysis reveals to have taken place in the cases that use The Bremen’s
standard to determine validity.
95. In the choice of law vocabulary, this is getting the wrong answer to a false conflict. See
Currie, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS at 93; see also Alfred Hill, The Judicial
Function in Choice of Law, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1585, 1590-1591(1985) (discussing false conflicts).
96. Ferens v. John Deere Co., 494 U.S. 516 (1990).
97. Id. at 519.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 520.
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The outcome in Ferens is widely considered bizarre and undesirable.
What went wrong, our analysis suggests, is that Mississippi thwarted
Pennsylvania’s substantive policy (peace of mind for defendants, the
substantive policy underlying limitations periods) without advancing any
Mississippi procedural policy. (Mississippi has no policy related to
litigation in Mississippi courts that is advanced by allowing litigation of
claims time-barred under the law that created them.) That is the same thing
the Court wisely refused to do in Guaranty Trust—there primarily for
reasons of uniformity, but also because there was no federal policy that
could support displacing the state rule. 101 Using The Bremen’s standard to
decide the validity of choice of forum clauses in diversity suits repeats
those errors. 102 It thwarts the state substantive policy, and it thwarts
federal procedural policy (policy-Erie’s preference for uniformity), in the
name of a policy (a federal substantive one) that should play no role in the
analysis.
V. CONCLUSION
Eighty years have passed since Erie was decided and the case has
become widely regarded as foundational in American jurisprudence. But
in these eighty years, courts have lost sight of Erie’s constitutional
underpinnings and a case about power has become a case about policy. In
this transition, unnecessary analytical steps have been added which
confuse Erie analysis.
The conflict of laws perspective, which we have offered here, returns
Erie to its roots. Fundamentally, Erie is a choice of law case. It’s a case
about which sovereigns have the power to grant rights and who
determines the meaning and content of those rights. Erie turned out to be
a false conflict once general law was removed from the equation. Only
one sovereign’s laws could apply. But the choice of law perspective still
has important implications for characterizing laws as substantive or
procedural and can provide a more solid foundation for courts to grapple
with even the murkiest of Erie issues.
101. This is our reading of the point that “a federal court adjudicating a state-created right solely
because of the diversity of citizenship of the parties is for that purpose, in effect, only another court
of the State.”—there is no federal substantive interest at stake. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S.
99 at 108 (1945).
102. There is also an oddity in that, as Carnival Cruise Lines recognizes, a choice of forum
clause is part of the parties’ bargain and may be offset by other contractual provisions: quid pro quo.
See Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 at 601 (1991). (Determining the validity of the
quid (the forum-selection clause) under federal law while determining the validity of the quo under
state law may have the result of unsettling the bargain—again, without advancing any sovereign’s
substantive policy, or indeed any policy at all.)
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Most important, constitutional Erie tells us that characterizing issues
in the abstract as substantive or procedural is a mistake. Each law should
be considered separately. Each sovereign has the authority to decide
whether its laws are substantive or procedural, and federal courts cannot
ignore this simply by framing the Erie question as unique. This is not to
say that federal law cannot prevail when a state deems its law substantive.
Federal procedural law can of course preempt state substantive law. What
we argue is simply that courts should recognize that priority is often at
stake in the substance-procedure characterization and the choice of law
determination should be made on the basis of the underlying policies of
the relevant laws (so, federal procedural policies in the case of a federal
law) rather than abstract labels detached from the content of those laws.
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